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There is a “mythical” interpretation of Hegel according to which the real protagonist of 
history is the “World-Spirit”. The World-Spirit “marches” through time and space. The 
Phenomenology gives the clearest account of the “march” in time; and there is as at least this 
much to be said for the “myth”: it enables us to see clearly that the supposed references in the text 
to the “Black Stone” of Mecca, and to the Indian caste-system of the “Laws of Manu”, are not 
intended by Hegel. We can see this because they do not fit properly in “the march of God into the 
world”; and the position clearly stated in the text is that “the whole Spirit” (i.e. the Absolute Spirit, 
or the religious consciousness of “God”) is in time.1    
 
 Just where the temporal march begins in the Phenomenology is ambiguous. We can accept 
Walter Jaeschke’s view that the “Light-Essence” is Yahweh as long as we refer it strictly to the 
“God of Abraham”, and accept the young Hegel’s view that Abraham experienced theophanies in 
Nature. 2 This has the considerable logical advantage of forming “religion” into a proper 
conceptual circle of experience. But it is methodically dubious because it is not “observational” ─ 
or at least the observational evidence is weak.  What makes me prefer to identify the “Light-
Essence” with the Ahura-Mazda of Zoroaster is first the fact that Persian religion was part of the 
Greek cultural heritage, while the Jews remained as invisible in history as their God was in 
concept; and secondly, the fact that Hegel makes an unmistakable reference to Yahweh in his 
discussion of Greek religion (Miller, §720). Yahweh is not the primitive Light-Essence of Natural 
religion, but the Light-Essence of Understanding, the power that will appear in Greek Religion as 
Fate, against which even Zeus is helpless.3  
 
For the “Hegel-Myth” this controversy is not very important. The Spirit “marches” out of 
“nowhere”  (the invisible Jewish experience) or out of Susa (which will fit better into the spatial 
dimension of the myth when we get to it) into our Greco-Roman and Christian-German history. It  
moves first to Greece; and then in the Hellenistic world of Alexander and his successors it 
becomes explicitly  “the World-Spirit”. The establishment of the Roman Empire and of a 
Pantheon legally regulated by the Emperor (who is recognized as a living “God”) is the “Unhappy 
Consciousness” of this World-Spirit ─ which existed in Classical Greece as True Spirit (a perfect 
harmony of Spirit with Nature, or in other words, as a World Concept in which true humanity was 
a “second nature” that is self-created within the divinely given order of subhuman Nature). 
 
With the conversion of Constantine, the Roman Empire (which as Empire moves 
eastwards to Constantinople) becomes the Universal Church. The Unhappy Consciousness now 
becomes a reconciled “faith” in that other properly divine Emperor who has sent his “Son” “far 
away and long ago” to be born and die as a finite being just like ourselves.4  
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The “Unhappy Consciousness” thus reconciled in the spreading of the Gospel, is the germ 
of “Faith” proper. Faith proper is born world-historically with Luther’s rediscovery of what St. 
Paul called “the witness of the Spirit with our spirit”. But in order for Paul’s intuition to become 
the experience of the World-Spirit, the Roman Church had to lose its last empirical connection 
with the Son of God as “Son of Man”. Thus, with the failure of the Crusades, the world of 
“Culture” lost its last link with the “Beyond”, and the conscious evolution of human rational 
autonomy (as the spiritual “vocation” of every human child of God, not as the “second nature” of 
the consciousness that could demonstrate its “freedom” in a life and death struggle) could finally 
begin.   
 
In and through this evolution   the “cultured” society of the social “estates” ordained by 
God was liquidated; and the ideal conflagration of values in “absolute Culture” leads to the real 
conflagration of the French Revolution. With the “advance of the undivided Substance of Absolute 
Freedom to the throne of the world” (Miller, § 585) the alienation of the Beyond as authoritative 
is overcome. The self-estrangement of Reason ends here; and in the promulgation of the “Rights 
of Man and citizen” Heaven is supposedly transplanted to Earth. But the Terror proves that Heaven 
on Earth is directly identical with hell; and the advent of the “absolute Religion” begins in 
“another land” (i.e. Germany empirically and Kant’s noumenal Kingdom of Ends ideally). What 
happens in that land is that the last figure of Divine Authority ─ the God of Practical Reason ─ 
loses his authoritative status, and becomes at last the “Spirit” of the Divine Man who proclaimed 
the forgiveness of sins.   
 
In this Providential “march” the overcoming of “estrangement” does appear to the finite 
consciousness to be its own work; but all the “religious” movement in the story appears to be the 
motion of the “object”. It is God who reveals himself in the successive shapes of our Culture. 
Thus, we can (and if we are determined to preserve the “standpoint of consciousness” we must) 
regard Hegel’s speculative philosophy as the quest for and the discovery of the truth about “God” 
(this being the ordinary name for the Sache selbst, or the “absolute Object”); and as long as we 
understand what is logically involved in the fact that God’s self-revelation takes place 
phenomenologically, the maintenance of the standpoint of consciousness does no harm. (It is even 
morally helpful in many contexts to see Hegel’s philosophy in this theological way, although it 
leaves the problem of the Fool who “says in his heart, there is no God” without any hope of a 
rational resolution.)   
 
But alas, Hegel at Berlin thought that (except for the logical evolution of finite 
consciousness which gave “phenomenology” a necessary place in his “Real Philosophy”, i.e. the 
interpretation of his actually present world) the Phenomenology had become superfluous. It was 
still valid of course; 5 but it was no longer pedagogically necessary. The higher standpoint of 
“pure thinking” was now firmly established; and beginning students could be introduced to it by a 
much shorter and easier route that went no further back then Descartes and Locke.  
 
Moreover, the Berlin professor, firmly established in a State-salaried professorship, now 
felt that he had a positive duty to act like a Philosopher-King, and to provide the philosophical 
myths that his society needed. So Hegel duly presented World-History to a general audience as a 
“theodicy”. He justified the ways of God to man by showing how “Divine Providence” uses 
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“world-historical individuals” to bring about the universal consciousness of the human vocation to 
rational freedom. 
 
The “march of the Spirit” myth now took a spatial as well as a temporal dimension. The 
Spirit was presented as coming to birth at the eastern edge of the Old World. It marched westwards 
through the great Asiatic “substantial” cultures until it came to the Middle East, where the 
genuinely historical march (the march in time) can begin. By implication, the great Oriental 
religions and cultures do not have any significant history. This spatial myth provided an 
ideological foundation for the imperialist attitudes and policies that the European nations had 
adopted in both the New and the Old worlds ever since the “modern” (German-Christian, i.e. 
Lutheran) age began. But when that spatial myth is examined in the light of the Lutheran “witness 
of the Spirit” it blows up in our faces. An army of learned Europeans (all secure in their 
professorships) could propagate this harsh Gospel; but the “witness of the spirit” came from 
Lutheran Denmark where a voice was heard asking why Divine Providence cared so little for the 
salvation of the Chinese or “the hitherto undiscovered tribe in Monomotapa”.6    
 
 It is certain that in some sense the philosopher-king believed his own myth. But he was 
definitely enough of a Lutheran to know that it did not “justify” and Christian conception of 
“Providence”. What then was his philosophical conception of the “Spirit” as it first appears in 
history? How should we conceive “the Light-Essence” which forms the hinge between the 
temporal myth that justifies itself “in experience” (i.e. through the recollection of the cultures that 
have already gone to their Last Judgement in history) and the spatial myth which nothing now can 
ever justify for because our own history has shown it to be the very shape of evil in our present 
generation (in mine anyway)?   
 
 If we will but attend to the supposedly “superfluous” Science of Experience the answer is 
not difficult to find. Simple Consciousness becomes aware of “the Infinite” (i.e. of the Absolute as 
a conceptual object) when the Newtonian Solar System “inverts” itself into the self-conscious 
world of “Life”; and when we try to observe ourselves rationally in the living environment, the 
“infinity” (or universality) of natural life disappears from view into the unfathomable mystery of a 
“stream of life that is indifferent to what kind of mills it drives” (Miller, § 285). “To him who 
looks at the world rationally”, said the philosopher-king propagating his myth, “the world looks 
rationally back”. This absolutely indifferent stream was how “the Divine Life” looked back at 
the rational scientist who was not yet in a position to propagate myths. This is the enlightened 
philosophical concept of what took place in the religion of Zarathustra as the “Light-essence. 
 
 Being the point of origin for natural religion, the Light-Essence cannot have a positive 
ethical dimension at all. It is essentially sublime, i.e. negative of everything finite. 7 This God is 
not a “self” because It does not recognize any other self. Its worshippers ─and even its “ministers” 
(its prophets and kings) ─ have no independent being. Even the “mills it drives” (the biologically 
distinct kinds of life) have not been marked consciously yet in this streaming forth of the divine. 
The “Light-essence” is the religious apprehension of Time as the Concept that “is there by not-
being” in Sense-Certainty at the beginning of the Phenomenology. The distinct “mills” begin to be 
acknowledged only in the Religion of Perception (“Plant and Animal”) that comes next.   
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 Philosophically speaking, then, “Providence” is originally just natural life; and it is the 
maturing of social consciousness that produces the cultural movement of human history. Wherever 
despotic power fails, and finite communities are able to express their “freedom”, we shall find first 
a world of warlike tribes, dominating the peaceful cultivators of the soil, and then an empire based 
on Understanding, in which the wild spiritual “animals” are domesticated into divinely ordained 
“castes” which each follow their own craft (as in the Egypt described by Herodotus). In its 
subhuman forms natural life simply takes every viable shape that the environment will allow; we 
cannot organize it rationally into any model of mathematical continuity (any “great chain of 
Being”) because the chanciness of the earth (and of its climate) breaks up the pattern everywhere, 
leaving the real Concept of Life dismembered as a kind of jigsaw puzzle with many missing 
pieces. 8  Upon this natural stage, the self-creation of human consciousness becomes a contingent 
interaction between opportunity and insight; and “Providence” is just a convenient name for the 
fact that insight is always only partial. Every insight into an opportunity offered by the natural and 
cultural situation creates by its own “realization”, the opportunity for a new insight which will 
“comprehensively invert” the direct intention of the original one.  
 
 The expression “comprehensive inversion” needs some explication at this point. Two kinds 
of inversion are involved in a phenomenological notion. First there is the simple inversion that 
happens as a spontaneous reaction to the realized concept. Thus, the rational insight involved in 
the religion of the Light-Essence can be expressed as “We don’t matter at all, we exist only in 
order to show forth God’s glory.” But then “Plant and Animal” expresses the natural and necessary 
opposite response: “We do matter to ourselves, and there is (there has to be) a God who cares 
precisely for us and for our life”. This reaction can hardly be said to involve a new insight at all, 
and it happens by natural necessity rather than by springing from an “opportunity”. It simply 
supplements (and corrects) the original intuition. When the problem of our importance is solved 
universally (in the “Plant Religion”) all that happens is that an Earth Mother joins the Sky Father; 
the resulting religious concept is perfectly stable. Instability arises because (in spite of the 
universal Sky Father) “our importance to ourselves” can have either a “universal” or a “particular” 
interpretation. Every particular community has its own Gods (and especially its own War God 
(for whom it is the only “animal” that counts). The resulting social disorder is an opportunity for 
cultural insight; and the re-stabilization of this situation involves a comprehensive inversion. We 
continue to use all the rhetoric of the “Light-Essence”. But now some human authority must act for 
God to establish and maintain the order that is the known will of the Divine Lord. Originally there 
was spontaneous submission to God. Then there was the contradiction between spoken submission 
and acted self-assertion. Now there is humanly imposed submission. Of course the 
“understanding” of what God wills is still only the comprehension of natural necessity. If someone 
does not stop the tribes of the Nile Valley from fighting one another, agriculture becomes 
impossible and famine ensues. But no doubt famine did happen often enough everywhere. It was 
the peculiar natural conditions of life in the Nile Valley that made the Egyptian religion into quite 
a different mode of consciousness from the simpler divine despotism of Susa. 
 
 What happened in Greece was at a different level altogether because it was not driven 
simply by natural necessity. The Greek achievement was essentially fragile. Cities could (and did) 
wipe one another out, with general massacres and enslavement. Eventually the whole system was 
overwhelmed by military conquest, and a new order ─ the order of universal Reason ─ was slowly 
created. Hegel’s confidence that because this new order was rationally necessary it could not be 
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overthrown was a matter of faith, not of logic. He believed that every genuine advance towards a 
rationally balanced system of institutions (where “rational balance” is what is produced by the 
process of “comprehensive inversion” that I have illustrated) must have a reliable self-preservative 
power because it increases our insight into the rational meaning of the essentially religious sense 
of community that has produced it. Hence he believed that the French Revolution was final, and 
that whatever the ideas of 1789 were effective, revolution would never be necessary again. Now 
that the Communist International has decisively failed we cannot say that he was certainly 
mistaken about that. In the perspective of his own time he would of course have agreed that a 
revolution might still be necessary in Czarist Russia. But he believed (indeed, he explicitly said) 
that nothing resembling Oriental despotism could be established in any “modern” State; and about 
that he was mistaken quite badly.  
 
 These rational beliefs of his were not logically guaranteed, any more than his beliefs about 
natural necessity were. He thought that there would always be peasants who could not become 
educated enough to be effective participants in rational politics: that women must be kept out of 
politics because the great majority of them have to become mothers with home and children to 
look after; and so on. None of these empirical beliefs matter philosophically ─ just as his 
(possible) belief in a real Providence that marches through the world does not matter. What is 
logically guaranteed is first that we must labour together to maintain and improve the community 
of “justice” and respect for conscience that we have achieved actually; and secondly, that 
regression is always possible, because Reason and Freedom are “identical”. (I have put justice in 
quotes because being a proper Hegelian “Concept” it is a dialectical contradiction. It seems both 
“fair recompense” and “equal opportunity”; and the two ideals are mutually contradictory. Thus it 
is actually rational that society is always “unjust” ─ see Phenomenology, Miller, § 430.) 
 
 I have said earlier that nothing can now justify the myth of a spatial march of Providence 
for us. I am certain of that, because we have seen the myth used to justify a return to the warfare of 
the “spiritual animals”. It has been made vividly obvious to us that any claim by one human 
community to be closer to God than the rest is morally revolting. Hegel was well aware of this. 
The necessary social foundation for the speculative observation of Religion is the achievement of 
a human community in which the inevitable equality of finite human imperfections is recognized; 
and the observer of Religion must understand that “the whole Spirit” is realized in every religion. 
The aim of philosophical observation is to identify the logical moment that is perfectly realized in 
each “shape” of social-religious experience. Then the place of that logical moment in the logical 
system of cognitive self-realization is what determines how completely the other moments of the 
Absolute Spirit can be rendered self-conscious. But all that is determined by this logical 
interpretation is the kind of knowledge of God and the self that is possible. It makes no sense to  
say that one kind of absolute cognitive experience is better than another. When we reach 
“Religion” in the Phenomenology we have left already the world of moral judgement ─ the world 
of good and bad, better and worse ─ behind us. So the right answer to that voice from Denmark 
was that the qualified user of Hegel’s spiritual map on which (as the same voice said) the whole of 
Denmark is a mere pinpoint, ought to be well aware that anyone can be “saved” in any religion, 
and that properly qualified Hegelian would concede as a probable empirical conjecture that 
Zarathustra’s experience of the Light-Essence was deeper and more “authentic” than the 
experience that some anonymous Danish Privadozent actually had of the God of Universal Love.  
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 Hegel says that the Absolute Spirit “picks out” the logical moment that it needs to realize at 
each stage of the journey (Miller, § 680). But this is mythical not just because the Absolute Spirit 
is destined too be translated into our own absolute self-knowledge (which leaves its status as the 
absolute object of consciousness in a highly ambiguous condition) but because the Absolute Spirit 
cannot do any “picking out”. The Spirit is simply bound to go on to the next stage of its logical 
development whenever opportunity and insight come together appropriately. It is the philosophical 
observer who has a choice; and Hegel exercised that choice at Berlin. He arranged and rearranged 
the world religions in different orders, because he saw different characteristics as logically 
important at different times. (That no moral judgement was intended at any stage of his struggle 
with the problem is guaranteed by the fact that the “Roman religion” is always in the middle of the 
order; and the Phenomenology shows us that for the World-Spirit the Roman religion represents 
the moment of absolute moral despair when “God is dead”.      
 
 Unlike the phenomenology of finite consciousness (in which every “shape” is constituted 
as a whole by the cumulative progress of the observation) the phenomenology of Religion is 
‘mythical” because we must make the logical choice (or impose the categoreal sequence of 
logically determined choices upon the chronological sequence of cultural experiences). This does 
no moral harm as long as we are dealing with cultural experiences that are over; everyone is free 
either to ignore or to criticize our interpretation by employing other categories for the same 
material. But when this cultural mythmaking touches living experience, the interpretation cannot 
avoid taking on a moral dimension ─ and the moral dimension of that judgement is one that 
usually falls short of mutual forgiveness. Hegel himself insisted wisely (at Berlin 1827) that 
educated Europeans cannot appreciate authentically the Bhagavad Gita because we do not have the 
cultural formation to which it belongs (Berliner Schriften, 137ff). But he did not explain why 
Providence cared so little for the Chinese; and already by then (1827) ─ and before he even had 
formulated the spatial myth publicly ─ Schopenhauer had undermined his comfortably complacent 
adoption of the standpoint of external observation; The World as Will and Representation was 
published in 1819.  
 
 Schopenhauer is interesting because he returns to what we have seen to be the logical point 
of origin for the “Hegel-Myth”. Schopenhauer’s “Will” is directly identical with Hegel’s stream of 
life that is indifferent to the mills it drives; and Schopenhauer looked to Hindu and Buddhist 
philosophy as the only source for conscious liberation from our natural bondage to the Will. His 
view is dialectically consistent with Hegel’s general position, because the Hindu intuition “Thou 
art that” expresses the fundamental claim of what is called Objective Idealism; and Nirvana is the 
“Night” out of which the Light-Essence itself is born.9   
 
 Hegel’s interest in Religion was entirely socio-political. He could cheerfully consign 
Hinduism and Buddhism to the logical rank of  “substantial” religions, because they are the 
communal consciousness of societies that are “substantial”, i.e., of societies in which self-
expression does not ─ and cannot ─ take the form of an active assertion of individual 
independence. Nothing else mattered to Hegel because his task is to comprehend a community in 
which the active cultivation of self-expression was recognized as the climax of rational 
achievement. The Marxists were logical in seeing the Hegelian philosophy (which had sublated 
religion) as the proper instrument for the universalization of that kind of active freedom. But Hegel 
understood his own philosophy as the comprehension of (and consequent rational reconciliation 
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with) all of the necessary economic and social limitations upon the enlightened ideal of individual 
freedom that the failure of the French Revolution had made manifest. 
 
 In the Hegelian perspective we can fairly interpret Schopenhauer’s philosophy (and its 
influence) as a turning away from the problem of “the rational society” (which was now solved in 
principle) and towards the deepening and enrichment of individual self-knowledge. A new 
beginning was necessary, and it went right back to the natural origin of human consciousness. 
Schopenhauer was morally pessimistic because he inverted Plato’s dictum. Instead of “persuading 
Necessity” Reason was persuaded by its necessity (i.e. by the rationality of the actual); but of 
course rational consciousness could not be happy about that. The Marxists maintained the Platonic 
dictum in its direct form (the actual must become rational ─ which was how Hegel glossed his 
own dictum in 1818). But that Marxist programme has now visibly come to grief; so pessimism is 
left in sole possession of the field. If it is true that “history has ended” how can we be 
philosophically happy about the permanence of things as they are?   
 
 Pessimism (like Marxist evangelism) was always a healthier reaction to the triumph of 
Hegelian rationalism than the comfortable logical superiority that was prepared to justify 
imperialist colonialism as God’s Providential plan. All three reactions were “Providential” of 
course. The imperialist duly infected the colonial peoples with the ideals of 1789. But Josiah 
Royce was right when he sought to persuade his Boston audience (essentially serious Protestant 
optimists like himself) that Schopenhauer’s pessimism was “a natural and healthy turn for the 
idealistic philosophy to take”. At the conclusion of his own lecture on Schopenhauer he declared 
his Hegelian faith thus: “if the world will be tragic, it shall still, in Satan’s despite, be spiritual”.10 
This seems to me to be the proper way to express the moral point of view from the neutral 
standpoint of “absolute knowing” (and the neutral standpoint is, after all, in a small way, a moral 
achievement). William James was mistaken certainly in calling Royce’s Absolute” a moral 
holiday”. But a moral holiday is exactly what the “Hegel myth” is (even when we understand it 
properly, i.e., in its logical sense).   
 
 It was the influence of Schopenhauer, no doubt, that caused Royce to give such careful and 
sympathetic attention to Hindu and Buddhist thought in his Gifford Lectures (1899-1900) on The 
World and the Individual. 11 This was the beginning of the properly Hegelian dissolution of the 
Hegel-myth; and what is important about the return to the “substantial” conception of ultimate 
reality, is that the divine becomes personal. 
 
 It is not clear just what is logically involved in the final transition from Religion to 
Absolute Knowledge in Hegel’s system. It is supposed to be a transformation of the form but not 
of the content. As far as I can see the “content’ is a human religious community which knows itself 
first inwardly “in God” (at the end of the Phenomenology Chapter VI) and then outwardly (in 
nature and the cultural world) through the recollective “religious” experience of Chapter VII. The 
“identity” of the community (as a “We that is I, but also It”) is represented in the “absolute 
religion” by the Christ-figure as the Incarnate Logos. But this is a Vorstellung; and it is the form 
of Vorstellung that must be given up in the transition to philosophy proper. One thing that is 
logically certain is that all fully moral “atheists” (all the fools who say in their hearts there is no 
God, but without falling away from the absolutely forgiving moral standpoint of the Broken-
Hearted Conscience) must be received into the philosophical community. Hegel’s “Absolute” is 
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still the “Invisible Church” that was the “rallying point” of the youthful revolutionaries in the Stift 
at Tübingen. 12 They found this watchword in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason [1792; 1793] (and in Lessing). And I suppose that the young Hegel would have included 
the Indian sages (along with Nathan and Saladin in Lessing’s play Nathan the Wise [1778/79]) in 
his “Invisible Church” from the first.    
 
 For myself, I continue to be an unabashed Hegelian idealist, not so much because I am 
committed to Royce’s theory of the Infinite Community (as indeed I am) but because I hold firmly 
to Peirce’s thesis that “Man is a sign” (which was itself the inspiration for Royce’s theory in its 
final mature form). When I first found that thesis in Giovanni Gentile’s Genesis and Structure of 
Society (1946) I did not know ─ any more than Gentile did ─ that it was already eighty years old. 
But I recognized the logical origin of it at once when I read in the Phenomenology, a few years 
later, that the concept of Spirit is “an I that is We and a We that is an I”; and the Phenomenology 
is sixty years earlier than Peirce’s essays. The logical primacy of the community of rational 
interpreters methodically requires us to invert the “standpoint of consciousness” (in which the 
singular thinking subject is primary, but the object is what is “real” or “true”). So now finally, by 
following the logic of the thesis that “God is spirit” I have here come around to a position of 
perfect agreement with Iris Murdoch’s argument that “We need a theology which can continue 
without God”.13     
 
 Being primarily a moralist, Iris Murdoch is more attached to the religious objective mode 
of consciousness than I am. The ‘speculative” tradition according to which “we live and move and 
have our being in God” is one to which she does not refer often. It is from that tradition, of course, 
that “absolute idealism” springs; but for Iris Murdoch “God” can never cease to be an “object”; 
and that is perfectly right and proper, since (even for someone like Eckhart who thinks and writes 
with the speculative tradition) Religion is a mode of “experience”. Thus, when Murdoch 
advocates “theology without God”, it is because she wants “the Absolute” to return to its original 
Platonic objectivity. Her philosophical translation for “God’ is Plato’s “Idea of the Good”.  
 
 I agree that this return to the beginning is now necessary, precisely because most of the 
religious will continue to disagree both with iris Murdoch and with me. They want a divinity who 
is both “real” and “personal”. But they will never agree among themselves either about whether He 
is one or somehow manifold (as in the Trinitarian doctrine, for example); or about whether He is 
Lawgiver and Judge, or Father and friend (or how the two roles can be reconciled). Lately, of 
course, the question whether He is not more properly “(S)he” has become a burning issue. But for 
those among whom all of these questions are seriously canvassed, the view that the divine is either 
impersonal or suprapersonal will continue to be unpalatable; and Platonic “separateness” is an 
“estranging” factor. 
 
 The necessary elimination of the Hegel-Myth (the supposedly real “March of God into the 
world”) from our religious discourse, and the recognition of the identity of Hegel’s Absolute with 
that of Hinduism ─ the identity of Royce with Schopenhauer, or of Plato’s supreme Idea with 
Hegel’s 14 ─ prompts one final reflection. The real nemesis of Hegel’s Idea has been the attempt to 
take over the word “real”. Hegel insisted (rightly) that the place of the old “metaphysics” must be 
taken by “Logic”. But he continued to talk as if Logic (because it is absolutely “objective”) is 
“real”. The Sache selbst in philosophy, he says, is “the actual cognition of what truly is” (Miller,   
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§73). But he goes on to show that “what truly is” takes many “true” shapes. The major 
achievement of the “Science of Experience” is to have put them into an intelligible historical order 
of development. But the objectivity of Logic is what belongs to the Platonically “Real”, not to the 
empirical concept whose many-sidedness is exhibited in the Phenomenology. 
 
 We all learn as children (even as babies before we can talk) that “the real” is what will not 
allow us to ignore it, what will trip us up and hurt us if we do not recognize and respect it. We 
cannot possibly dispense with that concept of “reality” in its ordinary sense. Why must we darken 
counsel (and create pseudo-problems for ourselves besides) by insisting that “only what is spiritual 
is truly real”? That sort of persuasive rhetoric is all very well for the religious (among whom it 
will never in fact be completely persuasive). But that does not belong to philosophy at all, and it 
will not (should not) persuade any philosopher who is not persuaded already. The philosopher’s 
proper business is not with persuasion, but with clarification. If we substitute the adjective 
“logical” for “real” we shall have to add still some qualifier (such as “concretely” or 
“existentially”) because “logical” has a firmly established ordinary use too. But we should then be 
doing justice to the claim of Paul Valéry: “The proper, unique and perpetual object of thought is 
that which does not exist”. 15 Royce’s  “the world … shall be spiritual ” is an implicit 
acknowledgement that it is just as true that “the spiritual is what is not real” as it is that “only what 
is spiritual is truly real”. Royce’s “real” Absolute was a useful myth ─ but it remained a myth in 
spite of all his logical struggles. As far as I can see ─ but I admit both to ignorance and to 
prejudice ─ Bradley’s Absolute was not even morally useful.  
 
 In any case, Hegelian philosophers must have done with myths. We are not cultural kings. 
We must leave that role to the disciples of Allan Bloom (or to anyone else who cannot learn from 
Heidegger’s awful example to steer clear of it). If we can school ourselves to say only what is 
conceptually unambiguous, we shall rid the philosophical community of a great mass of useless 
verbal disputes and polemics. We shall then be able to do what we ought to be doing for those who 
want to argue about whether “God exists” (and what [S]he is like); and we shall not have to hear 
those who are our rightful brothers and sisters saying that even “ more sinister” than “the 
outrageous implausibility of the whole [Hegelian] machine … is a lingering shadow of 
determinism, and the loss of ordinary everyday truth, that is of truth”. 16 The “outrageous 
implausibility” of the dialectical machinery will never cease to be canvassed ─ and I suppose it 
never should. Something better may indeed be possible ─ though I doubt it. Even the so called 
“Anglo-Hegelians” (including Royce) disliked and distrusted the dialectic; and Peirce, who is the 
greatest philosophical logician after Hegel, could find “nothing but music” (i.e., “outrageous 
implausibility”) in Hegel’s Logic. But Popper’s accusation of “determinism”, and the supposed 
“loss of truth” ─ that is a kind of outrageous nonsense that we can get rid of just by talking 
properly.            
 
           
 
            
                                                 
1 See Miller, § 679.For the religious consciousness it is “God” who moves to “reveal Himself”. Indeed, for 
consciousness it is always “The object” that moves “necessarily”, and not its own concept of the object that 
is changed “freely”. It is the observable possibility of regression in consciousness, that establishes the 
“freedom” of consciousness (in its Augustinian perspective as the freedom of disobedience) ─the freedom 
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of “obedience’ only becomes obvious when “disobedience” has been comprehended. The option of simply 
refusing to go forward also exhibits conscious freedom. But that only makes the “necessity” of the 
argument itself harder to grasp. Luckily this is not a problem in Chapter VII of the Phenomenology. 
2 See Walter Jaeschke, Reason in Religion: The Foundations of Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion. Translated 
by J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990, chapter II, 
section. 5.   
3 This is where the Mosaic God logically belongs in the “march of the Spirit”; and (as far as the “God of 
Abraham” is concerned) we ought not to begin with an immature Concept. Hegel never does this 
elsewhere in his “Science of Experience”.    
4 Jerusalem and the Jewish experience enter into the historic progress of the World-Spirit only when they 
are universally recollected.   
5 This is clearly implied by the fact that he gave a spare copy with some proof-corrections to a Greek 
student in one of his classes, (who took better care of it than Hegel’s professional friends did of many of his 
papers, so that our own “Critical edition” is now indebted to that student), and again by the fact that in the 
last months of his life Hegel began to prepare a new edition of his first big book.    
6 See Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript [1846], Princeton, 1941, p. 135.  
7 This is another argument against the identification of Yahweh as the Light-essence in the 
Phenomenology. For surely it is essential even to Abraham’s relation with God that he is recognized by 
God as the father of God’s own “people”. Sublimity is certainly the most important characteristic of 
Yahweh ─that is why there cannot be any image of him. But I do not believe that even in his most 
rigorously logical mood Hegel would ever have claimed that sublimity was Yahweh’s only essential 
characteristic. It has to be conceded however that in the Berlin years Hegel did not maintain this absolutely 
simple doctrine about Ahura-Mazda either. In his lectures Zoroaster’s religion becomes “the religion of the 
Good”. This admission of the ethical aspect as primitive to the concept of Absolute spirit, is in my view a 
logical improvement of the “biography of God” as related in the Phenomenology ─ and not just a historical  
correction resulting from improved knowledge. But then, of course, I think that Plato must be recognized as 
the fountainhead of rational mythology, as well as being the father of dialectic. The author of the 
Phenomenology felt he had to choose between the two Platos because the myths belonged to the romantic 
aristocrats of the spiritual life whom he was determined to displace. So not everything that the Berlin 
philosopher-king added to the Jena-Nuremburg record was regressive. In the Phenomenology the transition 
from “forgiveness” as the only absolute moral duty becomes much easier to comprehend, if we begin 
“Religion” with the identity of the “Light” as the “Good”. But for my present purpose the more abstract 
concept of the Light-Essence is a “fortunate-fall” because it makes the correctness of my thesis about the 
“river of Life” more evident. (I hold that that thesis is correct anyway.)  
8 This conception of the (logical) impotence of Nature is perfectly adapted for the reception of the 
evolutionary hypothesis.   
9 Miller, § 585: “the night of its essence” will not fit either Yahweh or Abura-Mazda. We have to remember 
the circularity of the Concept, and recollect the Logos as the Light shining in the Darkness, in order to 
understand what Hegel says. But the “recollection” of the “stress of life” validates Hegel’s description as 
“experience”.  
10 The Spirit of Modern Philosophy [1892], New York, George Braziller, 1955, p. 266 and p. 264. (Once 
upon a time, the Harvard professors, at least, knew how to use “shall” and “will”. Now we are all 
forgetting.     
11 2 vols., London, Macmillan, 1900-1.  
12 See Hegel, Briefe von und an Hegel (4 Vols.), edited and annotated by Johannes Hoffmeister with 
volume 4 edited and annotated by Friedrich Nicolin. Hamburg, 
 Felix Meiner, 1952 to 1981. Letter 8 [Hegel to Schelling, end of January 1795].  (Hegel: The Letters, 
Translated by Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler with commentary by Clark Butler. Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1984, p. 32.  
13 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. London, Chatto and Windus 1992 [Based on the 1982 
Gifford Lectures given at the University of Edinburgh], p. 511.   
14 Hegel’s “Idea” is the Idea of the Good conceived concretely ─ i.e., in its actual activity of informing the 
whole of “what is”. If we identify the “Light-Essence” as “the Good” this becomes explicit. But if start 
from its Parmenidean name “the One” we can see the conceptual identity that holds from the first paragraph 
of “Sense-Certainty”. Hegel’s way of envisaging “the dialectic” in experience has two important 
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consequences. First, he is not (in any significant empirical sense) a “monist”; and secondly, he can deal 
with the “problem of evil” without having to utter any morally outrageous Neoplatonic paradoxes. The 
Phenomenology is the story of the “errant cause” ─ or of “how evil is comprehended within the Divine 
Being” (cf. Miller, § 778-80).  
15 I do not know exactly where this comes from. I cite it from Iris Murdoch, ibid., [as endnote 13] p.506 (and 
she is depending on Simone Weil).  
16 Iris Murdoch, ibid., [as cited in endnote 13 above] p. 490. Emphasis in the original.   
